The term 'comorbidity' was introduced in The term 'comorbidity' was introduced in medicine by Feinstein (1970) to denote medicine by Feinstein (1970) to denote those cases in which a 'distinct additional those cases in which a 'distinct additional clinical entity' occurred during the clinical clinical entity' occurred during the clinical course of a patient having an index disease. course of a patient having an index disease. This term has recently become very fashThis term has recently become very fashionable in psychiatry to indicate not only ionable in psychiatry to indicate not only those cases in which a patient receives both those cases in which a patient receives both a psychiatric and a general medical a psychiatric and a general medical diagnosis (e.g. major depression and hyperdiagnosis (e.g. major depression and hypertension), but also those cases in which a tension), but also those cases in which a patient receives two or more psychiatric patient receives two or more psychiatric diagnoses (e.g. major depression and panic diagnoses (e.g. major depression and panic disorder). This co-occurrence of two or disorder). This co-occurrence of two or more psychiatric diagnoses ('psychiatric more psychiatric diagnoses ('psychiatric comorbidity') has been reported to be very comorbidity') has been reported to be very frequent. For instance, in the US National frequent. For instance, in the US National Comorbidity Survey (Kessler Comorbidity Survey (Kessler et al et al, 1994) , , 1994), 51% of patients with a DSM-III-R/ 51% of patients with a DSM-III-R/ DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Associa-DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1987 Association, , 1994 ) diagnosis of major tion, 1987, 1994) diagnosis of major depression had at least one concomitant depression had at least one concomitant ('comorbid') anxiety disorder and only ('comorbid') anxiety disorder and only 26% of them had no concomitant ('comor-26% of them had no concomitant ('comorbid') mental disorder, whereas in the Early bid') mental disorder, whereas in the Early Developmental Stages of Psychopathology Developmental Stages of Psychopathology Study (Wittchen Study (Wittchen et al et al, 1998 ) the corre-, 1998) the corresponding figures were 48.6% and 34.8%. sponding figures were 48.6% and 34.8%. In a study based on data from the AustraIn a study based on data from the Australian National Survey of Mental Health lian National Survey of Mental Health and Well-Being (Andrews and Well-Being (Andrews et al et al, 2002 (Andrews et al et al, ), , 2002 ), 21% of people fulfilling DSM-IV criteria 21% of people fulfilling DSM-IV criteria for any mental disorder met the criteria for any mental disorder met the criteria for three or more concomitant ('comorbid') for three or more concomitant ('comorbid') disorders. disorders.
This use of the term 'comorbidity' to This use of the term 'comorbidity' to indicate the concomitance of two or more indicate the concomitance of two or more psychiatric diagnoses appears incorrect psychiatric diagnoses appears incorrect because in most cases it is unclear whether because in most cases it is unclear whether the concomitant diagnoses actually reflect the concomitant diagnoses actually reflect the presence of distinct clinical entities or the presence of distinct clinical entities or refer to multiple manifestations of a single refer to multiple manifestations of a single clinical entity. Because 'the use of imprecise clinical entity. Because 'the use of imprecise language may lead to correspondingly language may lead to correspondingly imprecise thinking' (Lilienfeld imprecise thinking' (Lilienfeld et al et al, 1994 (Lilienfeld et al et al, ), , 1994 , this usage of the term 'comorbidity' should this usage of the term 'comorbidity' should probably be avoided. probably be avoided. However, the fact remains that the coHowever, the fact remains that the cooccurrence of multiple psychiatric diagoccurrence of multiple psychiatric diagnoses is now more frequent than in the noses is now more frequent than in the past. This is certainly in part a consequence past. This is certainly in part a consequence of the use of standardised diagnostic interof the use of standardised diagnostic interviews, which helps to identify several views, which helps to identify several clinical aspects that in the past remained clinical aspects that in the past remained unnoticed after the principal diagnosis had unnoticed after the principal diagnosis had been made -a development that is been made -a development that is obviously welcome because it is likely to obviously welcome because it is likely to lead to more comprehensive clinical manlead to more comprehensive clinical management and more reliable prediction of agement and more reliable prediction of future disability and service utilisation. future disability and service utilisation. But this is only one part of the story. The But this is only one part of the story. The other part is that the emergence of the other part is that the emergence of the phenomenon of 'psychiatric comorbidity' phenomenon of 'psychiatric comorbidity' has been to some extent a by-product of has been to some extent a by-product of some specific features of current diagnostic some specific features of current diagnostic systems. Artificially splitting a complex systems. Artificially splitting a complex clinical condition into several pieces may clinical condition into several pieces may prevent a holistic approach to the prevent a holistic approach to the individual, encouraging unwarranted individual, encouraging unwarranted polypharmacy, and may represent a new polypharmacy, and may represent a new source of diagnostic unreliability because source of diagnostic unreliability because clinicians may focus their attention on one clinicians may focus their attention on one or other of the different 'pieces', especially or other of the different 'pieces', especially in those clinical contexts in which coding in those clinical contexts in which coding of only one diagnosis is allowed. of only one diagnosis is allowed.
'PSYCHIATRIC 'PSYCHIATRIC COMORBIDITY' AS A COMORBIDITY' AS A BY-PRODUCT OF RECENT BY-PRODUCT OF RECENT DIAGNOSTIC SYSTEMS DIAGNOSTIC SYSTEMS
A powerful, usually unrecognised, factor A powerful, usually unrecognised, factor contributing to the emergence of the phecontributing to the emergence of the phenomenon of 'psychiatric comorbidity' has nomenon of 'psychiatric comorbidity' has been 'the rule laid down in the construction been 'the rule laid down in the construction of DSM-III (American Psychiatric Associaof DSM-III (American Psychiatric Association, 1980 ) that the same symptom could tion, 1980) that the same symptom could not appear in more than one disorder' not appear in more than one disorder' (Robins, 1994) . This rule (never made (Robins, 1994) . This rule (never made explicit, to my knowledge, in DSM-related explicit, to my knowledge, in DSM-related publications), probably explains why the publications), probably explains why the symptom 'anxiety' does not appear in the symptom 'anxiety' does not appear in the DSM-IV criteria for major depression, DSM-IV criteria for major depression, although the text of the manual although the text of the manual acknowledges that patients with major acknowledges that patients with major depression frequently present with anxiety. depression frequently present with anxiety. Lee Robins, the only author who, as far as I Lee Robins, the only author who, as far as I know, has mentioned the above rule in the know, has mentioned the above rule in the literature, stated: 'I thought then, as I still literature, stated: 'I thought then, as I still do, that the rule was not a good one' do, that the rule was not a good one ' (Robins, 1994) . Actually, DSM-IV does (Robins, 1994) . Actually, DSM-IV does not allow the presence of anxiety in a panot allow the presence of anxiety in a patient with major depression to be recorded tient with major depression to be recorded either as a symptom or, as allowed for either as a symptom or, as allowed for delusions, a specifier for the diagnosis. delusions, a specifier for the diagnosis. The concomitant diagnosis of major deThe concomitant diagnosis of major depression and panic disorder is encouraged pression and panic disorder is encouraged (being one of the most common forms of (being one of the most common forms of 'psychiatric comorbidity'), whereas the 'psychiatric comorbidity'), whereas the concomitant diagnosis of major depression concomitant diagnosis of major depression and generalised anxiety disorder is not and generalised anxiety disorder is not allowed (unless generalised anxiety occurs allowed (unless generalised anxiety occurs also when the patient is not depressed). also when the patient is not depressed). The latter exclusion criterion seems to be The latter exclusion criterion seems to be an acknowledgement of the implausibility an acknowledgement of the implausibility of the idea that anxiety and depression, of the idea that anxiety and depression, when they occur simultaneously, are two when they occur simultaneously, are two separate clinical entities, but it actually separate clinical entities, but it actually contributes to leaving the presence of contributes to leaving the presence of anxiety in a patient with major depression anxiety in a patient with major depression (with its significant prognostic and thera-(with its significant prognostic and therapeutic implications) totally unrecorded. peutic implications) totally unrecorded. Not surprisingly, both the elimination of Not surprisingly, both the elimination of the above exclusion criterion (Zimmerman the above exclusion criterion (Zimmerman & Chelminski, 2003) , which would be & Chelminski, 2003), which would be consistent with the logic of the system but consistent with the logic of the system but would multiply the cases of 'psychiatric cowould multiply the cases of 'psychiatric comorbidity', and the introduction of a mixed morbidity', and the introduction of a mixed depressive-anxiety diagnostic category depressive-anxiety diagnostic category (Tyrer, 2001) A second, obvious, determinant of the A second, obvious, determinant of the emergence of the phenomenon of 'psyemergence of the phenomenon of 'psychiatric comorbidity' has been the prolifchiatric comorbidity' has been the proliferation of diagnostic categories in recent eration of diagnostic categories in recent classifications. If demarcations are made classifications. If demarcations are made where they do not exist in nature, the probwhere they do not exist in nature, the probability that several diagnoses have to be ability that several diagnoses have to be made in an individual case will obviously made in an individual case will obviously increase. The current classification of increase. The current classification of anxiety and personality disorders is a good anxiety and personality disorders is a good example of this. It is rare to see a patient example of this. It is rare to see a patient with a diagnosis of an anxiety (or a personwith a diagnosis of an anxiety (or a personality) disorder who does not fulfil the ality) disorder who does not fulfil the criteria for at least one more anxiety (or criteria for at least one more anxiety (or personality) disorder. The fact that personality) disorder. The fact that 'neuroses and abnormal personalities' do 'neuroses and abnormal personalities' do not have clear boundaries either among not have clear boundaries either among themselves or with normality was clearly themselves or with normality was clearly recognised by Jaspers (1913; see below), recognised by Jaspers (1913; see below), and would argue in favour of a dimensional and would argue in favour of a dimensional approach to their classification. Paraapproach to their classification. Paradoxically, the attempt by the DSM to doxically, the attempt by the DSM to 1 8 2 1 8 2 A third relevant characteristic of A third relevant characteristic of current diagnostic systems is the limited current diagnostic systems is the limited number of hierarchical rules. A consolinumber of hierarchical rules. A consolidated tradition in psychiatry was to estabdated tradition in psychiatry was to establish a hierarchy of diagnostic categories so lish a hierarchy of diagnostic categories so that, for example, if a psychotic disorder that, for example, if a psychotic disorder were present, the possibly concomitant were present, the possibly concomitant neurotic disorders would not be diagnosed neurotic disorders would not be diagnosed because they would be regarded as part of because they would be regarded as part of the clinical picture of the psychotic condithe clinical picture of the psychotic condition. One could argue that the current posstion. One could argue that the current possibility of diagnosing a panic disorder in the ibility of diagnosing a panic disorder in the presence of a diagnosis of schizophrenia represence of a diagnosis of schizophrenia represents a useful development, because this presents a useful development, because this additional diagnosis provides information additional diagnosis provides information that may be useful for clinical management. that may be useful for clinical management. But are we sure that the occurrence of panic But are we sure that the occurrence of panic attacks in a person with schizophrenia attacks in a person with schizophrenia should be conceptualised as the 'comorbidshould be conceptualised as the 'comorbidity of panic disorder and schizophrenia'? Is ity of panic disorder and schizophrenia'? Is the panic of a person with agoraphobia, of the panic of a person with agoraphobia, of a person with major depression and of a a person with major depression and of a person with schizophrenia the same person with schizophrenia the same psychopathological entity that simply 'copsychopathological entity that simply 'cooccurs' with the other three? I am not aware occurs' with the other three? I am not aware of any research evidence on this issue. of any research evidence on this issue.
B R I T I S H J O UR N A L O F P SYC HI AT RY B R I T I S H J O UR N A L O F P S YC H I AT RY
A fourth relevant feature of our current A fourth relevant feature of our current diagnostic systems is the fact that they are diagnostic systems is the fact that they are based on operational diagnostic criteria. based on operational diagnostic criteria. Because of this, they are regarded as more Because of this, they are regarded as more precise and reliable than the traditional precise and reliable than the traditional ones based on clinical descriptions. Howones based on clinical descriptions. However, the old clinical descriptions provided ever, the old clinical descriptions provided a gestalt of each diagnostic entity, which a gestalt of each diagnostic entity, which is often not provided by current operational is often not provided by current operational definitions. This was probably due in part definitions. This was probably due in part to the different emphasis laid on the various to the different emphasis laid on the various clinical aspects (whereas in current operaclinical aspects (whereas in current operational definitions the various clinical tional definitions the various clinical features are usually given the same weight), features are usually given the same weight), as well as to the inclusion of some aspects as well as to the inclusion of some aspects regarded as essential (e.g. autism in the case regarded as essential (e.g. autism in the case of schizophrenia) that do not appear in of schizophrenia) that do not appear in current diagnostic systems because they current diagnostic systems because they are regarded as not sufficiently reliable. are regarded as not sufficiently reliable. Traditional clinical descriptions encourTraditional clinical descriptions encouraged differential diagnosis, whereas current aged differential diagnosis, whereas current operational definitions encourage multiple operational definitions encourage multiple diagnoses, probably in part because they diagnoses, probably in part because they are less able to convey the 'essence' of each are less able to convey the 'essence' of each diagnostic entity. Is this an intrinsic limitadiagnostic entity. Is this an intrinsic limitation of any operational definition, or a tion of any operational definition, or a remediable flaw of our current operational remediable flaw of our current operational definitions? Was the above-mentioned definitions? Was the above-mentioned gestalt (for instance, in the case of schizogestalt (for instance, in the case of schizophrenia) a fact or an illusion? Are we sure phrenia) a fact or an illusion? Are we sure that we have used all the resources of the that we have used all the resources of the operational approach in typifying, for operational approach in typifying, for instance, the disorder of social and instance, the disorder of social and interpersonal functioning in schizophrenia? interpersonal functioning in schizophrenia?
'PSYCHIATRIC COMORBIDITY' 'PSYCHIATRIC COMORBIDITY' AND THE NATURE OF AND THE NATURE OF PSYCHOPATHOLOGY PSYCHOPATHOLOGY Most of the recent debate about psychiatric Most of the recent debate about psychiatric comorbidity has been remarkably atheocomorbidity has been remarkably atheoretical, focusing on the practical usefulness retical, focusing on the practical usefulness of one or the other approach in terms of of one or the other approach in terms of treatment selection and prediction of outtreatment selection and prediction of outcome and service utilisation. However, the come and service utilisation. However, the emergence of the phenomenon of 'psychiemergence of the phenomenon of 'psychiatric comorbidity' has obvious theoretical atric comorbidity' has obvious theoretical implications. The frequent co-occurrence implications. The frequent co-occurrence of the mental disorders included in current of the mental disorders included in current diagnostic systems has recently been diagnostic systems has recently been regarded as evidence against the idea that regarded as evidence against the idea that these disorders represent discrete disease these disorders represent discrete disease entities (e.g. Cloninger, 2002). The point entities (e.g. Cloninger, 2002) . The point has been made that the nature of psychohas been made that the nature of psychopathology is intrinsically composite and pathology is intrinsically composite and changeable, and that what changeable, and that what is currently is currently conceptualised as the coconceptualised as the co-occurrence of occurrence of multiple disorders could be better reformumultiple disorders could be better reformulated as the complexity of many psychiatric lated as the complexity of many psychiatric conditions (with increasing complexity conditions (with increasing complexity being an obvious predictor of greater severbeing an obvious predictor of greater severity, disability and service utilisation). From ity, disability and service utilisation). From the psychodynamic viewpoint, the idea the psychodynamic viewpoint, the idea seems to be reinforced that the interaction seems to be reinforced that the interaction of congenital predisposition, individual exof congenital predisposition, individual experiences and the type and success of deperiences and the type and success of defence mechanisms employed may generate fence mechanisms employed may generate an infinite variety of combinations of sympan infinite variety of combinations of symptoms and signs. From the psychobiological toms and signs. From the psychobiological viewpoint, the hypothesis seems to be supviewpoint, the hypothesis seems to be supported that 'noxious stimuli . . . perturb a ported that 'noxious stimuli . . . perturb a variety of neuronal circuits . . . The extent variety of neuronal circuits . . . The extent to which the various neuronal circuits will to which the various neuronal circuits will be involved varies individually, and consebe involved varies individually, and consequently psychiatric conditions will lack quently psychiatric conditions will lack symptomatic consistency and predictabilsymptomatic consistency and predictability ' (van Praag, 1996) . From the evolutioity ' (van Praag, 1996) . From the evolutionary viewpoint, the concept seems to be nary viewpoint, the concept seems to be corroborated that mental disorders are the corroborated that mental disorders are the expression of preformed response patterns expression of preformed response patterns shared by all humans, which may be activshared by all humans, which may be activated simultaneously or successively in the ated simultaneously or successively in the same individual by noxae of various natsame individual by noxae of various nature -a view endorsed by Kraepelin himself ure -a view endorsed by Kraepelin himself in one of his later works, in which he in one of his later works, in which he dismissed the model of discrete disease dismissed the model of discrete disease entities even for dementia praecox and entities even for dementia praecox and manic-depressive insanity (Kraepelin, manic-depressive insanity (Kraepelin, 1920) . 1920).
However, the emergence of the pheHowever, the emergence of the phenomenon of 'psychiatric comorbidity' does nomenon of 'psychiatric comorbidity' does not necessarily contradict the idea that psynot necessarily contradict the idea that psychopathology consists of discrete disease chopathology consists of discrete disease entities. An alternative possibility is that entities. An alternative possibility is that psychopathology does consist of discrete psychopathology does consist of discrete entities, but these entities are not approprientities, but these entities are not appropriately reflected by current diagnostic cateately reflected by current diagnostic categories. If this is the case, then current gories. If this is the case, then current clinical research on 'psychiatric comorbidclinical research on 'psychiatric comorbidity' may be helpful in the search for 'true' ity' may be helpful in the search for 'true' disease entities, contributing in the long disease entities, contributing in the long term to a rearrangement of present classifiterm to a rearrangement of present classifications, which may involve a simplification cations, which may involve a simplification (i.e. a single disease entity may underlie the (i.e. a single disease entity may underlie the apparent 'comorbidity' of several disorapparent 'comorbidity' of several disorders), a further complication (i.e. different ders), a further complication (i.e. different disease entities may correspond to different disease entities may correspond to different 'comorbidity' patterns) or possibly a simpli-'comorbidity' patterns) or possibly a simplification in some areas of classification and fication in some areas of classification and a further complication in other areas. a further complication in other areas.
There is, however, a third possibility: There is, however, a third possibility: that the nature of psychopathology is inthat the nature of psychopathology is intrinsically heterogeneous, consisting partly trinsically heterogeneous, consisting partly of true disease entities and partly of of true disease entities and partly of maladaptive response patterns. This is maladaptive response patterns. This is what Jaspers (1913) actually suggested what Jaspers (1913) actually suggested when he distinguished between 'true when he distinguished between 'true diseases' (such as general paresis), which diseases' (such as general paresis), which have clear boundaries among themselves have clear boundaries among themselves and with normality; 'circles' (such as and with normality; 'circles' (such as manic-depressive insanity and schizomanic-depressive insanity and schizophrenia), which have clear boundaries with phrenia), which have clear boundaries with normality but not among themselves; and normality but not among themselves; and 'types' (such as neuroses and abnormal 'types' (such as neuroses and abnormal personalities), which do not have clear personalities), which do not have clear boundaries either among themselves or boundaries either among themselves or with normality. Recently, it has been with normality. Recently, it has been pointed out (Nesse, 2000) that throughout pointed out (Nesse, 2000) that throughout medicine there are diseases arising from a medicine there are diseases arising from a defect in the body's machinery and diseases defect in the body's machinery and diseases arising from a dysregulation of defences. If arising from a dysregulation of defences. If this is true also for mental disorders -for this is true also for mental disorders -for example, if a condition such as bipolar example, if a condition such as bipolar disorder is a disease arising from a defect disorder is a disease arising from a defect in the brain machinery, whereas conditions in the brain machinery, whereas conditions such as anxiety disorders, or part of them, such as anxiety disorders, or part of them, arise from a dysregulation of defencesarise from a dysregulation of defencesthen different classification strategies may then different classification strategies may be needed for the various areas of psychobe needed for the various areas of psychopathology. pathology.
